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OMITTING UNCOUNTABLE TYPES,
AND THE STRENGTH OF [0, 1]-VALUED LOGICS
XAVIER CAICEDO AND JOSE´ N. IOVINO
Abstract. We study [0, 1]-valued logics that are closed under the  Lukasiewicz-
Pavelka connectives; our primary examples are the the continuous logic frame-
work of Ben Yaacov and Usvyatsov [BYU10] and the  Lukasziewicz-Pavelka
logic itself. The main result of the paper is a characterization of these logics
in terms of a model-theoretic property, namely, an extension of the omitting
types theorem to uncountable languages.
Introduction
In this paper we deal with the model theory [0, 1]-valued logics. We focus on
logics that are closed under the  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka connectives. Our primary ex-
amples are the continuous logic framework of Ben Yaacov and Usvyatsov [BYU10]
and the  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic itself [Pav79a, Pav79b, Pav79c] (see also Sec-
tion 5.4 of [Ha´j98]). The main result of the paper is a characterization of these
logics in terms of a model-theoretic property, namely, an extension of the omitting
types theorem to uncountable languages.
If λ is an uncountable cardinal and T is a theory of cardinality ≤ λ, we will
say that a partial type Σ(x) in a logic L is λ-principal if there exists a set of
formulas Φ(x) of cardinality < λ such that T ∪ Φ(x) is consistent and T ∪ Φ(x) |=
Σ(x).
A logic L satisfies the λ-Omitting Types Property if whenever T is a consistent
theory of cardinality ≤ λ and {Σj(x)}j<λ is a set of types that are not λ-principal
over T there is a model of T that omits each Σj(x).
In the paper we work within a logic L whose semantics is given by the class of con-
tinuous metric structures. We prove that the uncountable Omitting Types Property
defined above characterizes L. Then, analogous characterizations of  Lukasiewicz-
Pavelka logic and the continuous logic framework of [BYU10] follow, by restricting
L to specific classes of structures.
The sentences of L are [0, 1]-valued. The connectives of L are the  Lukasiewicz
implication (ϕ→ ψ = min{1− ϕ+ ψ, 1}), and the Pavelka rational constants, i.e.,
for each rational r in the closed interval [0, 1] a constant connective with value r.
The quantifiers are ∀ and ∃ (only one of them is needed).
We observe that the restriction of L to the class of 1-Lipschitz structures is
predicate  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic, and its restriction to the class of complete
structures yields the continuous logic framework of [BYU10].
In the first part of the paper we prove the following result:
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Theorem 1. L satisfies the λ-Omitting Types Property for every uncountable car-
dinal λ.
In the second part we show that this property characterizes L:
Theorem 2. Let L′ be a [0, 1]-valued logic that extends L and satisfies the following
properties:
· The λ-Omitting Types Property for every uncountable cardinal λ,
· Closure under the of  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka connectives (see below) and the
existential quantifier,
· Every continuous metric structure is logically equivalent in L′ to its metric
completion.
Then every sentence in L′ is is a uniform limit of sentences in L.
Theorem 2 is the main result of the paper, and generalizes a characterization of
first-order logic due to Lindstro¨m [Lin78]. By restricting Theorem 2 to the class
of 1-Lipschitz structures we obtain a characterization of  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic,
and by restricting it to the class of complete structures we obtain an analogous
characterization of continuous logic. See Corollary 4.7.
The latter case uses a form of the λ-Omitting Types Property that asserts that
the type-omitting structure is complete. This version requires a stronger notion of
type principality, but it is a direct consequence of the λ-Omitting Types Property
of L.
The logic L is an instance of the general concept of continuous logic introduced
by Chang and Keisler in [CK66]. Nevertheless, in order to be consistent with the
use of the term “continuous logic” in recent literature, in the paper we refer to L
as “basic continuous logic”.
Our proof of the λ-Omitting Types Property is based on a general version of the
Baire Category Theorem (Proposition 3.2). The proof covers at once the uncount-
able case discussed above and the case λ = ω. (See Theorem 3.7.) The countable is
not new; omitting types theorems for [0, 1]-valued logics over countable languages
have been proved by Murinova´-Nova´k [MN06] (for  Lukasziewicz-Pavelka logic) and
by Henson [BYU07, BYBHU08] (for complete metric structures).
Our approach is topological. The usefulness of topological methods to study
model-theoretic properties of abstract logics is at the heart of several papers by the
first author (see, for example, [Cai93, Cai95, Cai99]). The topological approach fol-
lowed in those papers is particularly well-suited for settings such as those considered
here, where the logics at hand do not have negation in the classical sense. In such
settings the assumption that the space of structures is topologically regular serves
as the “correct” replacement of the classical negation. (Indeed, the collaboration
between both authors originated with the realization that the concept of regular
logic, which was isolated by the first author, is equivalent to the concept of logics
with weak negation that was introduced by the second author in [Iov01].) Utilizing
these ideas, the first author has proved topological versions of Lindstro¨m’s First
Theorem for first-order logic [Cai].
The paper is self-contained; no previous familiarity with abstract model theory,
with  Lukasiewicz logic, or with continuous logic is presumed. The basic definitions
are given in Section 1. Section 2 introduces the topological preliminaries. Section 3
is devoted to the proof of the λ-Omitting Types Property, and Section 4 contains
the proof the main theorem, Theorem 2.
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1. Structures and Logics
1.1. Continuous metric structures. Although, for simplicity, we will focus on
[0, 1]-valued continuous metric structures, our results regarding continuous logic
may be easily extended to bounded R-valued structures, or even unbounded struc-
tures, if we decompose them into bounded ones (see Section 1.7.), thus we prefer
to give the more general definition of continuous metric structure.
Definition 1.1. A continuous metric structure (or simply a structure) M consists
of the following items:
(1) A family (Mi, di)i∈I of metric spaces.
(2) A collection of functions of the form
F :Mi1 × · · · ×Min →Mi0 ,
called the operations of the structure, each of which is uniformly continuous
on every bounded subset of its domain.
(3) A collection of real-valued functions of the form
R :Mi1 × · · · ×Min → R,
called the predicates of the structure, each of which is uniformly continuous
on every bounded subset of its domain.
The constants of a structure are the 0-ary operations of the structure.
The metric spaces Mi are called the sorts of M , and we say that M is based
on (Mi)i∈I . If M is based on (Mi)i∈I , we will say that a structure is discrete
if for each i ∈ I the distinguished metric on the sort Mi is the discrete metric,
and all the predicates of M take values in {0, 1}. Note that if M is a discrete
structure, the uniform continuity requirement for the operations and predicates of
M is superfluous. A structure is complete if all of its sorts are complete metric
spaces.
Let M be a structure based on (Mi)i∈I . If (Fj)j∈J is a list of the operations of
M , and (Rk)k∈K is a list of the predicates of M , we may write
M = (Mi, Fj , Rk)i∈I,j∈J,k∈K .
If a1, . . . , an ∈ Mi, we denote by a¯ the list of elements a1, . . . , an and write
simply a¯ ∈ Mi. When the context allows it, we also denote by a¯ denote the tuple
(a1, . . . , an) by a¯. If it becomes necessary to refer to the length of a list or tuple of
elements a¯, we denote it by ℓ(a¯).
Examples of non-discrete structures include normed spaces, Banach algebras,
Banach lattices, and operator spaces. For more examples, see [HI02, Examples 2.2]
and [BYBHU08, Examples 2.1].
If a continuous metric structure M is based on a single metric space (M,d), we
say that M is a one-sorted structure. In this case we call (M,d) the universe of M .
For simplicity, we shall restrict our attention to one-sorted metric structures.
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Note that, informally, we use the same letter to denote a structure and its uni-
verse. We follow this convention throughout the paper.
LetM be a continuous metric structure, and letN be a metric space that extends
M and containsM as a dense subset. By the uniform continuity condition in Defini-
tion 1.1, each operation or predicate ofM has a unique extension to an operation or
predicate of N . The completion of a continuous metric structure (M,Fi, Rj)i∈I,j∈J
is the structure (M, F¯i, R¯j)i∈I,j∈J , where M is the metric completion of M and
F¯i, R¯j are the unique extensions of Fi, Rj from the appropriate powers of M to the
corresponding powers of M .
We call a one-sorted continuous metric structure bounded if its universe is bounded.
1.2. Signatures. In order to treat metric structures M model-theoretically, it is
convenient to have a formal way of indexing the operations and predicates of M ,
and specifying moduli of uniform continuity for them; this is a signature for M .
Definition 1.2. Let M be a bounded continuous metric structure with metric d.
A signature for M is a pair S = (S,U), where:
(1) S is a first-order vocabulary consisting of the following items: for each
operation F : Mn → M of M (respectively, predicate R : Mn → R of
M), a pair of the form (f, n) (respectively, (P, n)), where f and P are
syntactic symbols called n-ary operation symbol and n-ary predicate symbol,
respectively. If n = 0, f is called a constant symbol. In this context, F is
denoted fM and called the interpretation of f and R is denoted PM and
similarly called the interpretation of P .
(2) U is a family of uniform continuity moduli for the symbols in S, that is:
for each n-ary function symbol f or predicate symbol P of S an associated
function δ : Q ∩ (0, 1) → Q ∩ (0, 1) such that if a¯ = a1, . . . , an ∈ M and
b¯ = b1, . . . , bn ∈M ,
sup
1≤i≤n
d(ai, bi) < δ(ǫ) ⇒ d(f
M (a¯), fM (b¯)) ≤ ǫ
in the first case and
sup
1≤i≤n
d(ai, bi) < δ(ǫ) ⇒ |P
M (a¯)− PM (b¯)| ≤ ǫ
in the second.
If S = (S,U) is a signature forM , we say thatM is an S-structure or an S-structure,
depending on whether the uniform continuity moduli of U need to be made explicit
for the context.
If S, S′ are vocabularies, we write S ⊆ S′ if every operation and predicate symbol
in S is in S′ with the same arity. In this case we say that S′ is an extension of S.
Let S, S′ be vocabularies with S ⊆ S′ and suppose that N is an S′-structure.
The reduct of N to S, denoted N ↾ S, is the S-structure that results by removing
from N the operations and predicates that are indexed by S′ but not S. We say
that a continuous metric structure N is an expansion of a structure M if M is a
reduct of N .
Let S be a vocabulary and suppose that M and N are S-structures. We say
that M is a substructure of N (or that N is an extension of M) if the following
conditions hold:
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· The universe of N contains the universe ofM , and the distinguished metric
of N extends the distinguished metric of M .
· For every operation symbol f of S, the operation fN extends fM .
· For every predicate symbol P of S, the predicate PN extends PM .
Let S be a vocabulary and let M,N be S-structures. A metric isomorphism
between M and N is a surjective isometry T : M → N which commutes with the
interpretation of the operation and predicate symbols of S. We say that M and N
are metrically isomorphic (or simply isomorphic), and write M ≃ N , if there exists
a metric isomorphism between M and N .
Clearly, if S is a signature and M is an S-structure, then every structure that is
metrically isomorphic to M is also an S-structure.
A renaming is a bijection between vocabularies that sends function symbols to
function symbols, predicate symbols to predicate symbols, and preserves arities. If
M is an S-structure and ρ : S → S′ is a renaming, we denote byMρ the S′-structure
that results from converting M into an S′-structure through ρ.
1.3. Logics. The formal definition of model-theoretic logic was introduced by P. Lind-
stro¨m in his famous paper [Lin69]. Lindstro¨m’s original definition of logic was in-
tended for classical structures, i.e., discrete structures. Here we will use it for the
more general context of continuous metric structure given in Definition 1.1. In gen-
eral, throughout the paper, the word “structure” will stand for “continuous metric
structure”.
Definition 1.3. A logic L is a pair (SentL, |=L), where SentL is a function that
assigns to every vocabulary S a set SentL(S) called the set of S-sentences of L and
|=L is a binary relation between structures and sentences, such that the following
conditions hold:
(1) If S ⊆ S′, then SentL(S) ⊆ SentL(S′).
(2) If M |=L ϕ (i.e., if M and ϕ are related under |=L), then there is a vocab-
ulary S such that M is an S-structure and ϕ an S-sentence.
(3) Isomorphism Property. If M |=L ϕ and M ≃ N , then N |=L ϕ.
(4) Reduct Property. Let S ⊆ S′ and suppose ϕ is an S-sentence and M an
S′-structure. Then
M |=L ϕ if and only if (M ↾ S) |=L ϕ.
(5) Renaming Property. If ρ : S → S′ is a renaming, then for each S-sentence
ϕ there is an S′-sentence ϕρ such that M |=L ϕ if and only if Mρ |=L ϕρ.
(Recall that Mρ denotes the structure that results from converting M into
an S′-structure through ρ.)
If M |=L ϕ, we say that M satisfies ϕ, or that M is a model of ϕ.
The study of abstract logics is known as abstract model theory. For a survey,
the reader is referred to [BF85].
A logic L is said to be closed under conjunctions if given any two L-sentences
ϕ, ψ there exists an L-sentence ϕ ∧ ψ such that for every structure M
M |=L ϕ ∧ ψ if and only if M |=L ϕ and M |=L ψ.
Similarly, L is said to be closed under disjunctions if given two L-sentences ϕ, ψ
there exists an L-sentence ϕ ∨ ψ such that for every structure M
M |=L ϕ ∨ ψ if and only if M |=L ϕ or M |=L ψ.
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A logic L is said to be closed under negations if given an L-sentence ϕ there exists
an L-sentence ¬ϕ such that for every structure M
M |=L ¬ϕ if and only if M 2L ϕ.
Abstract logics without negation have been studied in [Iov01, GM04, GMV05].
Convention 1.4. We will assume that all logics are closed under finite conjunctions
and disjunctions, but not necessarily under negations. We will also assume that
every logic L mentioned is nontrivial in the following sense: for every structure M ,
there is a sentence ϕ such that M 2L ϕ.
Definition 1.5. Let S be a vocabulary.
(1) An S-theory (or simply a theory if the vocabulary is given by the context)
is a set of S-sentences.
(2) Let T be an S-theory. If M is an S-structure such that M |=L ϕ for each
ϕ ∈ T , we say that M is a model of T and write M |=L T .
(3) A theory T is consistent if it has a model.
If ϕ ∈ SentL(S) for some vocabulary S, but there is no need to refer to the
specific vocabulary, we may refer to ϕ an L-sentence. Similarly, when T is an S-
theory for some vocabulary S and there is no need to refer to S, we may refer to T
as an L-theory.
If S is a vocabulary, x¯ = x1, . . . , xn is a finite list of constant symbols not in S,
and ϕ is an (S∪{x¯})-sentence, we emphasize this by writing ϕ as ϕ(x¯). In this case
we may say that ϕ(x¯) is an S-formula. If M is an S-structure and a¯ = a1, . . . , an
is a list of elements of M , we write
(M,a1, . . . , an) |=L ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)
or
M |=L ϕ[a¯]
if the S∪{x¯} expansion ofM that results from interpreting xi by ai (for i = 1, . . . , n)
satisfies ϕ(x¯).
Definition 1.6. Let M,N be S-structures. We say that M and N are equivalent
in L, and write M ≡L N , if for every S-sentence ϕ we have M |=L ϕ if and only if
N |=L ϕ.
IfM is a structure and A is a subset of the universe ofM , we denote by (M,a)a∈A
the expansion of M that results by adding a constant symbol for each element of
A. The structure (M,a)a∈A is said to be an expansion of M by constants.
Definition 1.7. Let L be a logic and let M,N be S-structures with M a substruc-
ture of N . We say that M is an elementary substructure of N (with respect to L),
and write M L N , if (M,a)a∈A ≡ (N, a)a∈A.
Recall that a signature is a pair S = (S,U), where S is a first-order vocab-
ulary and U is a family of uniform continuity moduli for the symbols of S (see
Definition 1.2).
Definition 1.8. Let L be a logic.
(1) If λ is an infinite cardinal, L is λ-compact if whenever S is a signature and
T is an S-theory of cardinality ≤ λ such that every finite subset of T is
satisfied by an S-structure, the theory T is satisfied by an S-structure.
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(2) L is compact if it is λ-compact for every infinite λ.
The following concept will be needed for the statement of the Main Theorem
(Theorem 4.1).
Definition 1.9. We say that a logic L has the finite occurrence property if for
every vocabulary S and every S-sentence ϕ there is a finite vocabulary S0 ⊆ S such
that ϕ is an S0-sentence.
1.4. [0, 1]-valued logics. Hereafter, for simplicity, we focus on [0, 1]-valued struc-
tures, i.e., continuous metric structures where the distinguished metric and all the
predicates take values on the closed unit interval [0, 1]. More general structures are
discussed in Section 1.7.
We now refine Lindstro¨m’s definition of logic (Definition 1.3):
Definition 1.10. A [0, 1]-valued logic is a pair (SentL,V), where SentL is a function
that assigns to every vocabulary S a set SentL(S) called the set of S-sentences of
L and V is a functional relation such that the following conditions hold:
(1) If S ⊆ S′, then SentL(S) ⊆ SentL(S′).
(2) The relation V assigns to every pair (ϕ,M), where ϕ is an S-sentence of L
and M is an S-structure, a real number ϕM ∈ [0, 1] called the truth value
of ϕ in M .
(3) Isomorphism Property for [0, 1]-valued logics. If M,N are metrically iso-
morphic structures of L and ϕ is an S-sentence of L, then ϕM = ϕN .
(4) Reduct Property for [0, 1]-valued logics. If S ⊆ S′, ϕ is an S-sentence of L,
and M an S′-structure of L, then ϕM = ϕM↾S .
(5) Renaming Property for [0, 1]-valued logics. If ρ : S → S′ is a renaming,
then for each S-sentence ϕ of L there is an S′-sentence ϕρ such that ϕM =
(ϕρ)M
ρ
for every S-structure M .
Definition 1.11. If L is a [0, 1]-valued logic, ϕ is an S-sentence of L and M is an
S-structure such that ϕM = 1, we say that M satisfies ϕ, or that M is a model of
ϕ, and write M |=L ϕ.
Note that if L is [0, 1]-valued logic, then (SentL, |=L) is a logic in the sense of
Definition 1.3. Therefore we may apply to L all the concepts and properties defined
so far for plain logics.
Definition 1.12. The  Lukasiewicz implication is the function →L from [0, 1]
2 into
[0, 1] defined by
x→L y = min{1− x+ y, 1}.
Note that x→L y = 1 is and only if x ≤ y.
Definition 1.13. We will say that a [0, 1]-valued logic L is closed under the basic
connectives if the following conditions hold for every vocabulary S:
(1) If ϕ, ψ ∈ SentL(S), then there exists a sentence ϕ→L ψ ∈ SentL(S) such
that (ϕ→L ψ)M = (ϕ)M →L(ψ)M for every S-structure M .
(2) For each rational r ∈ [0, 1], the set SentL(S) contains a sentence with
constant truth value r. These sentences are called the constants of L.
Notation 1.14. If L is a [0, 1]-valued logic that is closed under the basic connectives
ϕ is a sentence of L, and r is a constant of L, we will write ϕ ≤ r and ϕ ≥ r, as
abbreviations, respectively, of ϕ→L r and r→L ϕ.
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Remark 1.15. Let L be a [0, 1]-valued logic and let S be a vocabulary. If M
is an S-structure of L, ϕ is an S-sentence of L, and r is a constant of L, then
M |=L ϕ ≤ r if and only if ϕM ≤ r, and M |=L ϕ ≥ r if and only if ϕM ≥ r; thus,
the truth value ϕM is determined by either of the sets
{ r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] |M |=L ϕ ≤ r }, { r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] |M |=L ϕ ≥ r }.
The following proposition will be invoked multiple times in the paper; the proof
is left to the reader.
Proposition 1.16. Let L be a [0, 1]-valued logic that is closed under the basic
connectives, let ϕ be an S-sentence of L, and let r, s be constants of L. Then, for
every S-structure M , one has
(1) ϕM ≤ (ϕ ≥ r)M .
(2) ((ϕ ≥ r) ≥ s)M = (ϕ ≥ (r + s− 1))M .
Notation 1.17. If L is a [0, 1]-valued logic that is closed under the basic connectives
and ϕ, ψ are sentences of L, we write ¬ϕ and ϕ∨ψ, as abbreviations, respectively,
of ϕ→L 0 and (ϕ→L ψ)→L ψ, and ϕ ∧ ψ as an abbreviation of ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ).
Note that for every S-structure M , one has
(ϕ ≤ 0)M =1− (ϕ)M ,
(ϕ ∨ ψ)M =max{ϕM , ψM},
(ϕ ∧ ψ)M =min{ϕM , ψM}.
In particular, every [0, 1]-valued logic that is closed under the basic connectives is
closed under conjunctions and disjunctions.
We will refer to any function from [0, 1]n into [0, 1], where n is a nonnegative
integer, as am n-ary connective. The  Lukasiewicz implication and the Pavelka
constants are continuous connectives, as are all the projections (x1, . . . xn) 7→ xi.
The following proposition states that any other other continuous connective can be
approximated by finite combinations of these.
Proposition 1.18. Let C be the class of connectives generated by the  Lukasiewicz
implication, the Pavelka constants, and the projections through composition. Then
every continuous connective is a uniform limit of connectives in C.
Proof. Since C is closed under the connectives max{x, y} and min{x, y}, by the
Stone-Weierstrass Theorem for lattices [GJ76, pp. 241-242], we only need to show
that the connectives rx, where r is a dyadic rational, can be approximated by
connectives in C.
Notice that if x ∈ [0, 1],
1
2
x = lim
n
(
n∨
i=1
i
n
∧ ¬(x→L
i
n
)
)
.
Hence, since the truncated sum ⊕ : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] is in C (as x⊕ y = ¬x→L y), so
are all the connectives (12x+ · · ·+
1
2n )x, for any positive integer n. 
The following concept will be invoked in the statement of the Main Theorem
(Theorem 4.1).
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Definition 1.19. Let L be a [0, 1]-valued logic. We say that L is closed under
existential quantifiers if given any any S-formula ϕ(x) there exists an S-formula ∃xϕ
such that for every S-structure M one has (∃xϕ)M = supa∈M (ϕ[a]
M ). Similarly,
we say that L is closed under universal quantifiers if given any any S-formula
ϕ(x) there exists an S-formula ∀xϕ such that for every S-structure M one has
(∀xϕ)M = infa∈M (ϕ[a]M ).
1.5. Basic continuous logic, continuous logic, and  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka
logic. In this subsection we define two particular [0, 1]-valued logics, namely, the
continuous logic framework of [BYU10] and the  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic (see,
for example, Section 5.4 of [Ha´j98]). Both are logics for continuous metric struc-
tures. Traditionally, both logics have focused on particular classes of structures:
the emphasis in continuous logic is in complete structures with arbitrary uniform
continuity moduli, while in  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic the focus has been on struc-
tures whose operations and predicates are 1-Lipschitz. However, as model-theoretic
logics, both can be seen as restrictions to specific classes of structures of a more
general framework that we introduce here and call basic continuous logic.
The structures of basic continuous logic are all continuous metric structures.
The class of sentences of this logic is defined as follows.
For a vocabulary S, the concept of S-term is defined as in first-order logic. If
t(x1, . . . , xn) is an S-term (where x1, . . . , xn are the variables that occur in t), M is
an S structure, and a1, . . . , an are elements of M , the interpretation t
M [a1, . . . , an]
is defined as in first-order logic as well. The atomic formulas of S are all the
expressions of the form d(t1, t2) or R(t1, . . . , tn), where R is an n-ary predicate
symbol of S. If ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is an atomic S-formula with variables x1, . . . , xn and
a1, . . . , an are elements of and S-structure M , the interpretation ϕ
M [a1, . . . , an] is
defined naturally by letting
R(t1, . . . , tn)
M [a1, . . . , an] = R
M (tM1 [a1, . . . , an], . . . , t
M
n [a1, . . . , an])
and
d(t1, t2)
M [a1, . . . , an] = d
M (tM1 [a1, . . . , an], t
M
2 [a1, . . . , an]).
The S-formulas of basic continuous logic are the syntactic expressions that re-
sult from closing the atomic formulas of S under the  Lukasiewicz implication, the
Pavelka constants, and the existential quantifier; formally, the concept of S-formula
and the interpretation ϕM of a formula ϕ in a given structure M are defined in-
ductively by the following rules:
· All atomic formulas of S are S-formulas.
· If ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and ψ(x1, . . . , xn) are S-formulas, then ψ→L ψ is a formula;
if a1, . . . , an ∈ M , the interpretation (ψ→L ψ)M [a1, . . . , an] is defined as
(ψM [a1, . . . , an])→L(ψ
M [a1, . . . , an]).
· If ϕ(x1, . . . , xn, x) is an S-formula, then ∃xϕ is a formula; if a1, . . . , an ∈M ,
the interpretation (∃xϕ)M [a1, . . . , an] is defined as supa∈M (ϕ[a]
M [a1, . . . , an]),
· For every rational r ∈ [0, 1] there is an S-formula, denoted also r, whose
interpretation in any structure is the rational r.
We write M |=CL ϕ[a1, . . . , an] if ϕ[a1, . . . , an]M = 1. A sentence of basic
continuous logic is a formula without free variables, and the truth value of a S-
sentence ϕ in an S-structure M is ϕM .
Recall that in any [0, 1]-valued logic that is closed under the basic connectives,
the expressions ¬ϕ, ϕ ∨ ψ, ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ ≤ r, and ϕ ≥ r are written as abbreviations
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of ϕ→L 0, (ϕ→L ψ)→L ψ, ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ), ϕ→L r, and r→L ϕ, respectively. In basic
continuous logic we also regard ∀xϕ as an abbreviation of ¬∃x¬ϕ.
Having defined basic continuous logic, let us now describe the [0, 1]-valued logic
that Ben Yaacov and Usvyatsov introduced in [BYU10] and called continuous first-
order-logic. We will refer to this framework simply as continuous logic. It is an
instance of the more general concept of continuous logic studied by Chang and
Keisler in [CK66], and was proposed by Ben Yaacov and Usvyatsov as a reformu-
lation of Henson’s model theory of complete metric spaces1
The class of structures of continuous logic is the class of complete metric struc-
tures. The concepts of formula and sentence for this logic are defined as for basic
continuous logic, but instead of taking the closure under the  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka
connectives one takes the closure under all continuous connectives (and the exis-
tential quantifier). Proposition 1.18 gives us the following:
Remark 1.20. For every S-formula ϕ(x¯) of continuous logic and for every ǫ > 0
there exists a formula ψ(x¯) of basic continuous logic such that |ϕM [a¯]−ψM [a¯]| < ǫ
for every S-structure M and every tuple a¯ in M with ℓ(a¯) = ℓ(x¯).
This observation allows us to transfer model-theoretic results from basic contin-
uous logic to continuous logic, by simply restricting them to the realm of complete
metric structures.
Finally, let us discuss  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic. Pavelka extended  Lukasiewicz
propositional logic by adding the rational constants, and proved a form of approx-
imate completeness for the resulting logic. See [Pav79a, Pav79b, Pav79c] (see also
Section 5.4 of [Ha´j98].) This is known as Pavelka-style completeness. The exten-
sion of  Lukasiewicz logic with Pavelkas’s constants is referred to in the literature as
rational Pavelka logic, or Pavelka many-valued logic. Nova´k proved Pavelka-style
completeness for predicate  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic, which he calls “first-order
fuzzy logic”, first using ultrafilters [Nov89, Nov90], and later using a Henkin-type
construction [Nov95]. Another proof of Pavelka-style completeness for predicate
 Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic was given by Hajek; see [Ha´j97] and [Ha´j98, Section 5.4].
Hajek, Paris, and Stepherson have proved that  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic is a con-
servative extension of  Lukasiewicz predicate logic [HPS00].
The formulas of  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic are like those of basic continuous
logic, with the difference that in place of the distinguished metric d one uses the
similarity relation x ≈ y. However, there is a precise correspondence between the
two relations, namely, d(x, y) is 1 − (x ≈ y) (in other words, the two relations are
negations of each other); see Section 5.6 of [Ha´j98], especially Example 5.6.3-(1).
Also, in  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic, in place of the uniform continuity requirement
given in Definition 1.2, for each n-ary operation symbol f , one has the axiom
(x1 ≈ y1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn ≈ yn)→L(f(x1 . . . , xn) ≈ f(y1, . . . yn)),
and similarly, for each n-ary predicate symbol R, one has the axiom2
(x1 ≈ y1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn ≈ yn)→L(R(x1 . . . , xn) ↔L R(y1, . . . yn)).
1For a survey of Henson’s logic as it regards structures based on normed spaces, see [HI02].
The more general framework devised by Henson for arbitrary continuous metric structures was
never published.
2Here we use (α ↔L β) as an abbreviation of (α→L β) ∧ (β→L α).
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See Definition 5.6.5 of [Ha´j98]. Thus,  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic is the restriction of
basic continuous logic to the class of 1-Lipschitz structures, i.e., structures whose
operations and predicates are 1-Lipschitz.
Below, we state, without proof, some of the fundamental properties of basic
continuous logic. Versions of Theorems 1.21, 1.22, and 1.25, were first proved
by Henson in the mid 1970’s, for Banach spaces instead of general metric struc-
tures, and using Henson’s logical formalism of positive bounded formulas instead
of [0, 1]-valued logics. (Henson’s apparatus was one of the main motivations for the
development of continuous logic).
The most distinctive model-theoretic property of basic continuous logic is com-
pactness:
Theorem 1.21 (Compactness of Basic Continuous Logic). Let S be a signature
and let T be an S-theory. If every finite subtheory of T is satisfied by an S-structure,
then T is satisfied by an S-structure; furthermore, this structure can be taken to be
complete.
Theorem 1.21 can be proved by taking ultraproducts of [0, 1]-valued structures.
The argument is simple, but we omit the details, as they are not directly relevant
to the rest of the paper.
One one obtains compactness for continuous logic by restricting Theorem 1.21
to complete structures and invoking Remark 1.20. Restricting the theorem to 1-
Lipschitz structures yields compactness of  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic, but it must be
noted that in this case the 1-Lipschitz condition makes it unnecessary to fix uniform
continuity moduli; in other words, for  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic, the statement of
Theorem 1.21 holds with the signature S replaced by a vocabulary S.3
If M is a structure and A is a subset of the universe of M , we denote by 〈A〉
the closure of A under the functions of M , and by M ↾ 〈A〉 the substructure of M
induced by 〈A〉.
Theorem 1.22 (Tarski-Vaught Test for Basic Continuous Logic). Let M be an S-
structure. If A is a subset of M and S(A) is extension of S that includes a constant
symbol for each element of A, the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) M ↾ 〈A〉 CL M , and 〈A〉 is contained in the closure of A in M .
(2) For every S(A)-formula ϕ(x), if N |=CL ϕ[b] for some element b of N ,
then for every rational r ∈ (0, 1) there is an element ar of M such that
N |=CL ϕ[ar] ≥ r.
A direct consequence of Theorem 1.22 is the following property:
Corollary 1.23. Let M be a metric structure and let N be a substructure of M .
(1) If N is dense in M , then N ≺CL M .
(2) If N ≺CL M , and N is the closure of N in M , then N ≺CL M
It follows from the main result of [Iov01] that no 0, 1]-valued logic for continuous
metric structures that extends basic continuous logic properly satisfies the com-
pactness property and the Tarski-Vaught Test. In other words, basic continuous
logic is maximal with respect to these two properties.
3Note that a modulus of uniform continuity with δ(ǫ) = ǫ does not guarantee 1-Lipschitz
continuity.
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Now we turn our attention to the downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem
for basic continuous logic. We state two versions of this theorem; the first version
is for arbitrary continuous metric structures (Theorem 1.24) and the second one is
for complete structures (Theorem 1.25). In the continuous logic literature, where
complete structures are emphasized, only the second version is usually stated; how-
ever, the standard argument used to prove the second version proceeds by first
showing that the first version holds, and then taking completions and invoking
Corollary 1.23. We state the first version as a separate theorem, for it will be
needed in the proof of Lemma 3.13).
Theorem 1.24 (Lo¨wenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem for Continuous Metric Struc-
tures). For every S-structureM and every subset A of M there exists a substructure
N of M such that
(1) N ≺CL M ,
(2) A ⊆ N ,
(3) |N | ≤ |A|+ |S|+ ℵ0.
The version for complete metric structures is analogous, but in this context the
“correct” measure of size of a structure is its density, rather than its cardinality.
The density character (or simply density) of a metric spaceM , denoted density(M),
is the smallest cardinal of a dense subset of M .
Theorem 1.25 (Lo¨wenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem for Complete Metric Struc-
tures). For every complete S-structure M and every subset A of M there exists a
complete substructure N of M such that
(1) N ≺CL M ,
(2) A ⊆ N ,
(3) density(N) ≤ density(A) + |S|+ ℵ0.
1.6. Relativizations to discrete predicates. It is often helpful to know that
the fact that a predicate is discrete, in the sense that it only takes on values in
{0, 1}, can be expressed using formulas of basic continuous logic:
Definition 1.26. Let M be an S-structure and let P a predicate symbol of S. We
define Discrete
(
P (x¯)
)
to be the S-formula
P (x¯) ∨ ¬P (x¯),
and call PM discrete if M |= ∀x¯ Discrete
(
P (x¯)
)
.
Definition 1.26 will play an important role in the proof of the Main Theorem
(Theorem 4.1).
Let S be a vocabulary and let P (x) be a monadic predicate not in S. If M is
a (S ∪ {P})-structure such that PM is discrete, and a valid S-structure of L is
obtained by restricting the universe of M to { a ∈ M | M |=L P [a] }, we denote
this structure by M ↾ {x | P (x)}. Note that if M is complete, the continuity of
P ensures that the preceding structure, when defined, is complete. If ϕ is an S-
formula of continuous logic, the relativization of ϕ to P , denoted ϕ{x|P (x)} or ϕP ,
is the (S ∪ {P})-formula defined by the following recursive rule:
· If ϕ is atomic, then ϕ{x|P (x)} is ϕ.
· If ϕ is of the form C(ψ1, . . . , ψn), where C is a connective, then ϕ{x|P (x)}
is C(ψ
{x|P (x)}
1 , . . . , ψ
{x|P (x)}
n ).
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· If ϕ is of the form ∃xψ, then ϕ{x|P (x)} is ∃y(ψ(y) ∧ ψ{x|P (x)}).
· If ϕ is of the form ∀xψ, then ϕ{x|P (x)} is ∀y(¬ψ(y) ∨ ψ{x|P (x)}).
Then, if M and P are as above, we have
(ϕ{x|P (x)})M = ϕM↾{x|P (x)}.
In the preceding rule, instead of the monadic predicate P (x) we may have a
binary predicate symbol R(x, y); this shows that the logics discussed in this section
have the following property:
Definition 1.27. We will say that a [0, 1]-valued logic L permits relativization to
definable families of predicates if for every vocabulary S, every S-sentence ϕ and
every predicate predicate symbol R(x, y) not in S there is an (S ∪ {R})-formula
ψ(x), denoted ϕ{y|R(x,y)}(x), such that the following holds: whenever M is an
(S ∪ {R})-structure such that for every a in M ,
· either M |= R[a, b] or M |= ¬R[a, b] for every b in M , and
· (M,a) ↾ {y | R(x, y)} is defined as a structure of L,
one has
(ϕ{y|R(x,y)})M [a] = ϕM↾{y|R(x,y)}[a].
In this case, we call the formula ϕ{y|R(x,y)}(x) a relativization of ϕ to { y | R(x, y) }.
A logic L has the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property for sentences if every sentence
of L that has a model has a countable model. The first author has proved the
following version of Lindstro¨m’s First Theorem [Cai]:
Theorem 1.28. Let L be an extension of continuous logic that satisfies the follow-
ing properties:
· Closure under the  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka connectives and relativization to dis-
crete predicates,
· Compactness,
· The Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property for sentences.
Then L is equivalent to continuous logic.
A similar result holds for extensions of first order  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic,
under the additional assumption that any consistent theory has a complete model.
1.7. Beyond the interval [0, 1]. For simplicity, we have focused our attention on
continuous metric structures of diameter bounded by 1. The formalism of basic
continuous logic can be adapted to cover bounded structures of arbitrary diameter.
However, the resulting logic is not compact, but rather locally compact, in the
following sense:
Theorem 1.29. Let S be a signature. For every bounded S-structureM there is an
S-sentence ϕ and a rational r ∈ (0, 1) such that M |= ϕ and the following property
holds. If T is an S-theory such that every finite subset of T ∪ {ϕ ≥ r} is satisfied
by an S-structure, then T ∪ {ϕ ≥ r} is satisfied by an S-structure.
The main results of the paper, namely, Theorems 3.7 and 4.1 hold under this
wider semantics, although the second result holds locally only. One way to obtain
this generalization is to use 0 instead of 1 as designated truth value for |=, and the
truncated subtraction on [0, 1] instead of the  Lukasiewicz implication.
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2. Logics and Topologies
In this section we associate with every logic L a topology that we call the logical
topology of L. The idea of using the logical topology to study properties of abstract
logics is due to the first author [Cai93, Cai95, Cai99]. We will focus on logics whose
logical topology is regular.
If L is a logic and S is a signature, we will denote by StrL(S) the class of
S-structures of L. For every S-theory T of L, define
ModS(T ) = {M ∈ StrL(S) |M |=L T }.
The following is the main definition of this section. This concept will play a
central role in our arguments.
Definition 2.1. The logical topology on StrL(S), denoted τL(S), is the topology
on StrL(S) whose closed classes are those of ModS(T ), where T is a theory.
The following proposition follows directly from the definitions.
Proposition 2.2. Let L be a logic.
(1) L is compact if and only if the space ( StrL(S), τL(S) ) is compact, for every
signature S.
(2) L is λ-compact if and only if the space ( StrL(S), τL(S) ) is λ-compact, for
every signature S.
Since we are assuming that all logics are closed under finite disjunctions (see
Convention 1.4), the classes of the form
ModS(ϕ) = {M ∈ StrL(S) |M |=L ϕ },
where ϕ ∈ SentL(S), are closed under finite unions. These classes form a base of
closed classes for the logical topology on StrL(S).
Convention 2.3. Let L be a [0, 1]-valued logic that is closed under the basic
connectives and let S be a signature. If ϕ is a sentence of L, and r ∈ [0, 1] is a
constant of L, we write
ModS(ϕ < r) and ModS(ϕ > r),
respectively, as abbreviations for the classes
StrL(S) \ModS(ϕ ≥ r) and StrL(S) \ModS(ϕ ≤ r).
Note that the classes of the form ModS(ϕ < 1) where ϕ ∈ SentL(S) for a base
for τL. By replacing ϕ with ¬ϕ, it follows that the classes of the form ModS(ϕ < 1)
for a base for τL as well.
2.1. Comparing logics through their topologies.
Definition 2.4. Let L,L′ be logics with the same class of structures. We will say
that L′ extends L, and write L ≺ L′, if τL(S) ⊆ τL′(S) for every signature S. We
will say that L and L′ are equivalent , and write L ∼ L′, if both L ≺ L′ and L′ ≺ L
hold.
Recall that a topological space X is regular if and only it has a local base of
closed neighborhoods, i.e., whenever x ∈ X and U is a neighborhood of x there
exists a neighborhood W of x such that W ⊆ U . We shall focus our attention
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on logics whose logical topology is regular. The following observation is useful to
compare logics.
If (X, τ) is topological space and x, y ∈ X , one says that x and y are τ-
indistinguishable, denoted x
τ
≡ y, if every τ -neighborhood of x contains y and
every τ -neighborhood of y contains x. Note that if (X, τ) is a regular topological
space and x, y ∈ X , then x
τ
≡ y if and only if every τ -neighborhood of x contains
y. Also,
{
z ∈ X | z
τ
≡ x
}
is the τ -closure of {x}. If τ, τ ′ are topologies on X and
any two τ -indistinguishable points of X are also τ ′-indistinguishable, we will write
τ
≡ ⇒
τ ′
≡.
If L is a logic and M,N is a structure of L, then, clearly, M ≡L N if and only if
M and N are indistinguishable in the logical topology of L. If L and L′ are logics
with the same class of structures, we write ≡L ⇒ ≡L′ if
τL(S)
≡ ⇒
τ
L′
(S)
≡ for every
vocabulary S.
Suppose that τ and τ ′ are topologies on a set X such that τ ⊆ τ ′. Clearly,
τ ′
≡ ⇒
τ
≡. The following proposition shows that under sufficient compactness of τ ′,
from
τ
≡ ⇒
τ ′
≡ one can obtain τ = τ ′.
Recall that the weight of a topological space (X, τ) is the smallest possible car-
dinality of a base for τ .
Proposition 2.5. Let τ, τ ′ be regular topologies on X such that τ ⊆ τ ′ and
τ
≡ ⇒
τ ′
≡.
If τ has weight λ and and τ ′ is λ-compact, then τ ′ = τ .
Proof. Let B be a base for τ of cardinality λ, and fix U ∈ τ ′ in order to prove U ∈ τ .
Fix now x ∈ U and y ∈ U c. Since x and y are τ ′-topologically distinguishable and
τ
≡ ⇒
τ ′
≡, there exist disjoint τ -open sets Vx,y,Wx,y such that x ∈ Vx,y and y ∈ Wx,y.
Without loss of generality, we may assumeWx,y ∈ B. SinceWx,y ∈ τ ⊆ τ ′, allowing
y to range over all elements of U c and using the λ-compactness of τ ′, we obtain
Vx ∈ τ such that x ∈ Vx and Vx ⊆ U . Since x is arbitrary in U , this shows that U
is τ -open. 
2.2. [0, 1]-valued logics and regularity. We now link the concept of [0, 1]-valued
logic of Definition 1.10 with the logical topology introduced in this section.
Proposition 2.6. Let L be a [0, 1]-valued logic that is closed under the basic con-
nectives and let S be a signature.
(1) Every S-sentence is a continuous function from (StrL(S), τL(S)) into [0, 1].
(2) (StrL(S), τL(S)) is a regular topological space.
Proof. Both conclusions follow readily from the observation that if ϕ is a sentence
and r, s are rationals with 0 ≤ r < s ≤ 1, then ϕ−1[r, s] = ModS(ϕ ≥ r∧ϕ ≤ s). 
3. A General Omitting Types Theorem
The main result of this section is Theorem 3.7.
3.1. A general version of the Baire Category Theorem. Let X be a topolog-
ical space and let x ∈ X be given. Recall that a subclass G of X is a neighborhood
of x if there is an open subclass O of G containing x. If λ is any infinite cardinal,
we will say that a subclass G of X is a λ-neighborhood of x if G is an intersection
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of less than λ neighborhoods of x. We will say that G is a λ-neighborhood if G
is a λ-neighborhood of some point in X . This definition of λ-neighborhood yields
naturally definitions concepts of λ-open, λ-interior, λ-dense, etc.
Definition 3.1. Let X be a topological space and λ an infinite cardinal. We
will say that X has the λ-Baire Property if whenever {Di}i<λ is a collection of
subclasses of X that are λ-open and λ-dense, the intersection
⋂
i<λDi is λ-dense.
Note that the ω-Baire Property is simply the classical Baire Property. Also, a
topological space X has the λ-Baire Property if and only if a union of ≤ λ many
λ-closed classes with empty λ-interior has empty λ-interior. This is immediate by
taking complements in Definition 3.1.
A topological space X is regular if and only it has a local base of closed neighbor-
hoods; this means that whenever x ∈ X and U is a neighborhood of x there exists a
neighborhood W of x such that W ⊆ U . Note that this form of regularity is inher-
ited by passing to λ-neighborhoods, i.e., if X is regular and U is a λ-neighborhood
of x, then there exists a λ-neighborhood W of x such that W ⊆ U .
Proposition 3.2. Every locally compact regular topological space has the λ-Baire
property for every infinite cardinal λ.
Proof. Suppose {Di}i<λ are λ-open and λ-dense in X , and let O be a nonempty
λ-open subclass of X . We must show that O ∩
⋂
i<λDi is nonempty. Below we
define, recursively, a decreasing sequence (Ui)i<λ of λ-neighborhoods such that
(1) U0 is compact and U0 ⊆ O,
(2) U i ⊆ Di, for i < λ,
(3) U j ⊆ Ui for j < i < λ.
The construction is as follows. For i = 0, the set D0∩O is nonempty by hypothesis
and λ-open by construction, so, by regularity and local compactness, there exists a
λ-neighborhood U0 such that U0 ⊆ D0 ∩O and U0 is compact.
Assume that i < λ is positive and Uj has been defined for j < i with the
properties indicated above. Then
⋂
j<i Uj 6= ∅: if i is successor, say, i = j0 + 1,
this is because
⋂
j<i Uj = Uj0 , and if i is limit,
⋂
j<i Uj =
⋂
j<i U j , which is
nonempty by the compactness of U0. Since Di is λ-dense, Di∩
⋂
j<i Uj is nonempty,
and by regularity we can find a λ-neighborhood Ui such that U i ⊆ Di
⋂
j<i Uj.
This concludes the recursive definition. Finally, by compactness, we obtain ∅ 6=⋂
i<λ U i ⊆
⋂
i<λDi ∩O.

Corollary 3.3. Let λ be an infinite cardinal. If X is locally compact regular topo-
logical space and {Gi}i<λ is a collection of λ-open subclasses of X, then
⋂
i<λGi
has the λ-Baire property.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 3.2, but with the added condition that
Ui ⊆ Gi for every i < λ. 
3.2. Statement of the general omitting types theorem. Let L be a logic and
let S be a signature. If x¯ = x1, . . . , xn a finite list of constant symbols not in S and
Σ is a set of (S ∪ {x¯})-sentences, we emphasize this by writing Σ as Σ(x¯). If M is
an S-structure and a¯ = a1, . . . , an is a tuple of elements of M such that M |=L σ[a¯]
for every σ(x¯) ∈ Σ(x¯), we say that M satisfies Σ(x¯), and that a¯ realizes Σ(x¯) in
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M . If T is an S-theory and M is an S-structure that satisfies T , we say that Σ(x¯)
is an S-type of T .
If Γ(x¯),Σ(x¯) are S-types for a theory T , we write T,Γ(x¯) |=L,S Σ(x¯) if whenever
M is an S-structure that is a model of T , every realization of Γ(x¯) in M is also a
realization of Σ(x¯).
Definition 3.4. Let Σ(x¯) be an S-type of a consistent theory T . A set Φ(x¯) of
S-formulas is a generator of Σ(x¯) over T (or generates Σ(x¯) over T ) if
(1) T ∪ Φ(x¯) is satisfiable by an S-structure, and
(2) T ∪ Φ(x¯) |=L,S Σ(x¯).
Definition 3.5. Let T be a consistent S-theory and let Σ(x¯) be an S-type of T .
(1) If λ is an uncountable cardinal, we will say that Σ(x¯) is λ-principal over T
if there exists a set of cardinality less than λ that generates Σ(x¯) over T .
(2) We will say that a Σ(x¯) is ω-principal over T if there exist terms t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯),
where n = ℓ(x¯) and a single formula ϕ(y¯) such that
(a) ϕ(y¯) generates the type Σ(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯)) over T , and
(b) T ∪ {ϕ(y¯) ≥ r} |=L,S Σ(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯)), for some r ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1).
If Σ(x¯) is an S-type for T and M is a S-structure that is a model of T , we will
say that M omits Σ(x¯) if it does not realize it, i.e., if for every a¯ ∈ M , there is
σ(x¯) ∈ Σ(x¯) such that M |=L σ[a¯] < 1.
Definition 3.6. Let L be a logic and λ an infinite cardinal. We will say that L
has the λ-Omitting Types Property if whenever T is an S-theory of cardinality ≤ λ
that is satisfied by an S-structure and {Σj(x¯)}j<λ is a set of S-types that are not
λ-principal over T there is a model of T that omits each Σj(x¯).
The following is the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.7. Basic continuous logic has the λ-Omitting Types Property for every
infinite cardinal λ.
The rest of this section falls into into two parts. In the first part, we study
the link between our uncountable version of the Baire Category Theorem and the
logical topology for regular logics. In the second part we prove Theorem 3.7.
3.3. The λ-Baire property and classes of structures.
Definition 3.8. A logic L is locally compact if the space ( StrL(S), τL(S) ) is locally
compact for every signature S, and regular if ( StrL(S), τL(S) ) is regular for every
signature S.
By Proposition 2.6-(2), every [0, 1]-logic that is closed under the basic connectives
is regular.
Proposition 3.9. Let L be a locally compact regular logic and let λ be an infinite
cardinal. Then
(1) StrL(S) has the λ-Baire Property.
(2) If T is an S-theory, then ModS(T ) has the λ-Baire Property.
Proof. The first part is given by Proposition 3.2. For the second part, notice that
since ModS(T ) is closed, it inherits local compactness from StrL(S), so this part
follows from Proposition 3.2 as well. 
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For the rest of this section, the background logic is basic continuous logic, and
the background topology is the logical topology on StrL(S), where S is a fixed
signature of cardinality ≤ λ
Let C = (ci)i<λ be a family of new constants. We denote by (S∪C) the signature
that results from adding the constants in C to S. We will denote (S∪C)-structures
as (M,~a), where M is an S-structure and ~a = (ai)i<λ interprets (ci)i<λ. In this
context, 〈~a〉 denotes the closure of ~a under the functions ofM , andM ↾ 〈~a〉 denotes
the substructure of M induced by 〈~a〉.
For the rest of the section, W will denote the class of (S ∪ C)-structures of the
form (M,~a) such that M ↾ 〈~a〉 is an elementary substructure of M and 〈~a〉 is
contained in the topological closure of ~a in M .
Proposition 3.10. Let λ be an infinite cardinal and let T be a (S ∪ C)-theory of
cardinality at most λ that is satisfied by an S-structure. Then the class W∩ModS(T )
is nonempty and has the λ-Baire Property.
Proof. Let
(
ϕi(x)
)
i<λ
be a list of all the (S ∪ C)-formulas in one variable. By the
Tarski-Vaught Test (Theorem 1.22), we have (M,~a) ∈W if and only if the following
condition holds:
for every i < λ and r ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1), if M |=CL ∃xϕi(x), then M |=CL
ϕi(cj) > r for some j < λ.
This means that
W =
⋂
i<λ
⋂
r∈Q∩(0,1)
(
ModS
(
∃xϕi(x) < 1
)
∪
⋃
j<λ
ModS
(
ϕi(cj) > r
))
.
Thus, by Corollary 3.3, the class W has the λ-Baire property. The class W ∩
ModS(T ) has the λ-Baire property by Corollary 3.3 and Proposition 3.9. This
class is non empty because, by the downward Lwenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem
(Theorem 1.24), T is satisfied by an S-structure M of cardinality ≤ λ, and thus
interpreting the constants by an enumeration ~a of M yields (M,~a) ∈W. 
3.4. Proof of the general omitting types theorem. Note that if λ is an
uncountable cardinal and Σ(x¯) is λ-principal over T , where x¯ = x1, . . . , xn and
t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯) are terms, then the type Σ(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯)) is λ-principal over T .
The following lemma shows that in basic continuous logic the converse of this fact
holds.
Lemma 3.11. If λ is an uncountable cardinal and Σ(x1, . . . , xn) is an S-type of
T such that Σ(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯)) is λ-principal over T , where t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯) are
S-terms, then Σ(x1, . . . , xn) is λ-principal over T .
Proof. Let {ϕi(y¯)}i∈I generate Σ(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯)
)
over T . For each finite I0 ⊆ I,
define ψI0 (x¯) as
∃y¯
( ∧
k≤n
d(xk, tk(y¯)) ≤ 0 ∧
∧
i∈I0
ϕi(y¯)
)
.
We claim that the set of formulas of the form ψI0(x¯), where I0 is a finite subset of
I, generates Σ(x¯) over T . The proof is a standard compactness argument in basic
continuous logic, but since we are not assuming previous experience with continuous
logic, we include the details below.
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Fix σ(x¯) ∈ Σ(x¯) and rationals r, r′ such that 0 < r < r′ < 1. Since T ∪
{ϕi(y¯)}i∈I |=CL,S Σ(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯)), by compactness there exists a finite I0 ⊆ I
such that
(*) T ∪
{ ∧
i∈I0
ϕi(y¯)
}
|=CL,S σ(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯)) ≥ r.
Since S includes uniform continuity moduli for all the predicate and operation
symbols that occur in σ, there exists a rational δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
(**)
∧
k≤n
d(xk, tk(y¯)) ≤ δ ∧ σ(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯)) ≥ r
′ |=CL,S σ(x1, . . . , xn) ≥ r.
By (∗) and (∗∗),
T ∪
{ ∧
k≤n
d(xk, tk(y¯)) ≤ δ ∧
∧
i∈I0
ϕi(y¯)
}
|=CL,S σ(x1, . . . , xn) ≥ r.
Since σ is arbitrary and r is arbitrarily close to 1, this shows that the set of formulas
of the form ψJ (x¯), where J is a finite subset of I, generates Σ(x¯) over T . 
We now prove some lemmas that connect principality with the logical topology
τL on StrL(S) (see Definition 2.1).
Recall that if X is a topological space and x ∈ X , then a λ-neighborhood of x
is an intersection of less than λ neighborhoods of x. If A is a subclass of X , the
λ-interior of A is the set of points in x that have a λ-neighborhood contained in A.
Lemma 3.12. Let Σ(x¯) be an S-type of a theory T with ℓ(x¯) = n, and let λ be an
infinite cardinal.
(1) If λ is uncountable, then Σ(x¯) is λ-principal over T if and only if the class
ModS∪{x¯}
(
T ∪ Σ(x¯)
)
has nonempty λ-interior in ModS∪{x¯}(T ).
(2) If λ = ω, then Σ(x¯) is ω-principal over T if and only if there exist terms
t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯) such that the class ModS∪{y¯}
(
T ∪ Σ(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯))
)
has
nonempty interior in ModS∪{y¯}(T ).
Proof. Assume that λ is uncountable and Σ(x¯) is λ-principal over T , and let
{ϕi(x¯)}i<µ generate Σ(x¯) over T , where µ < λ. The class
ModS∪{x¯}(ϕi(x¯)) =
⋂
r∈Q∩(0,1)
ModS∪{x¯}(ϕi(x¯) > r)
is λ-open and hence so is
ModS∪{x¯}({ϕi(x¯)}i<µ) =
⋂
i<µ
ModS∪{x¯}(ϕi(x¯)).
Since T∪{ϕi(x¯)}i<µ is satisfiable by an S-structure and T∪{ϕi(x¯)}i<µ |=CLS Σ(x¯),
the class
ModS∪{x¯}(T ) ∩ModS∪{x¯}(({ϕi(x¯)}i<µ)
is a nonempty λ-open subclass of ModS∪{x¯}(T ) contained in ModS∪{x¯}(Σ(x¯)).
Suppose, conversely, that ModS∪{x¯}(T∪Σ(x¯)) has nonempty λ-interior in ModS∪{x¯}(T ).
Then there exist µ < λ and formulas ϕi(x¯) for i < µ such that
ModS∪{x¯}(T ) ∩
⋂
i<µ
ModS∪{x¯}(ϕi(x¯) > 0)
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is a nonempty subclass of ModS∪{x¯}(T ∪ Σ(x¯)). Choose ri ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1) such that
T ∪ {ϕi(x¯) ≥ ri}i<µ is satisfiable by an S-structure. Then,
T ∪ {ϕi(x¯) ≥ ri}i<µ |=CL,S Σ(x¯),
which finishes the proof of the uncountable case.
For the case λ = ω, suppose that ϕ(y¯) generates Σ(t1(y), . . . , tn(y)) over T and
T ∪ {ϕ(y¯) ≥ r} |=L,S Σ(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯)), where t1(y), . . . , tn(y) are terms and r ∈
Q∩(0, 1). Since, by the definition of generator, ModS∪{y¯}(T ∪{ϕ(y¯)}) is nonempty,
if r′ ∈ Q∩ (r, 1), the class ModS∪{y¯}(T )∩ModS∪{y¯}(ϕ(y¯) > r
′) is a nonempty open
subclass of ModS∪{y¯}(T ) contained in ModS∪{y¯}(Σ(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯))).
To finish the proof for the countable case, assume that ModS∪{y¯}(T∪Σ(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯)))
has nonempty interior. Then there is a formula ϕ(y¯) such that
∅ 6= ModS∪{y¯}(T ) ∩ModS∪{y¯}(ϕ(y¯) > 0) ⊆ ModS∪{y¯}(T ∪ Σ(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯))).
As before, choose r ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1) such that T ∪ {ϕ(y¯) ≥ r} is satisfiable by an
S-structure. Then,
T ∪ {ϕ(y¯) ≥ r} |=CL,S T ∪ {ϕ(y¯) > 0} |=CL,S Σ(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯)).
This shows that Σ(x¯) is ω-principal over T . 
For the next lemma, we follow the notation used in Proposition 3.10. Let T be
an S-theory. For i = i1, . . . , in ∈ λ, let RT,i be the map
RT,i : W ∩ModS∪C(T )→ ModS∪{ci1 ,...,cin}(T )
(M,~a) 7→ (M,ai1 , . . . , ain).
Lemma 3.13. The map RT,i is continuous, open and surjective.
Proof. For notational simplicity, we will consider the case when n = 1. Continuity
follows directly from the fact that any (S∪{ci1})-sentence is also an (S∪C)-sentence.
Now, with each (S∪C)-sentence ϕ = ϕ(c1, . . . , ci1 , . . . , cm), with all the constants
in C exhibited, let us associate the (S ∪ {ci1})-sentence θ(ci1) defined as
∀x1 · · · ∀xm ϕ(x1, . . . , ci1 , . . . , xm).
To show that RT,i is open and surjective, it suffices to show that RT,i maps
ModS∪C(ϕ)
c ∩W ∩ModS∪C(T ) onto ModS∪{ci1}
(
θ(ci1)
)c
∩ModS∪{ci1}(T ).
Suppose (M,~a) ∈ ModS∪C(ϕ)c ∩ W ∩ ModS∪C(T ), and let r ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1) be
such that (M,~a) |=CL ϕ ≤ r. We certainly have (M,ai1) |=CL θ(ci1 ) ≤ r, so
(M,ai1) ∈ModS∪{ci1}
(
θ(ci1 )
)c
∩ModS∪{ci1}(T ).
Suppose, conversely, that (M,ai1) ∈ ModS∪{ci1}
(
θ(ci1)
)c
∩ModS∪{ci1}(T ), and
let r ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1) be such that (M,ai1) |=CL θ(ci1 ) ≤ r. Pick r
′ ∈ Q ∩ (r, 1). Then
there are elements ak ∈ M , for k ≤ m and k 6= i1, such that (M,a1, . . . , am) |=CL
ϕ ≤ r′. Since |T | ≤ λ, the downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem (Theorem 1.24)
guarantees that there is an elementary substructure M0 of M of cardinality ≤ λ
containing a1, . . . , am. Using the constants cj with j /∈ {i1, . . . , in} to name the
remaining elements ofM0, we see that (M,~a) ∈ ModS∪C(ϕ)c∩W∩ModS∪C(T ). 
We now have the material we need to prove Theorem 3.7:
Proof of the omitting types theorem. Let T be theory of cardinality ≤ λ that is
satisfied by an S-structure and let {Σj(x1, . . . , xn)}j<λ be a set of types that are
not λ-principal over T . By hypothesis in the countable case, and by Lemma 3.11
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in the uncountable case, the types Σj(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯)) are not principal over T ,
for any choice of terms t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯); hence, without loss of generality, we may
assume that
(*) Σ(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯)) is on the list whenever Σ(x1, . . . , xn) is.
Let C be as before. By Lemma 3.12, for any i = i1, . . . , in and any j < λ, the class
ModS∪{ci1 ,...,cin}
(
T ∪ Σj(ci1 , . . . , cin)
)
is closed with empty λ-interior. Therefore, by Lemma 3.13, so is
CT,i = R
−1
T,i
(
ModS∪{ci1 ,...,cin}
(
T ∪ Σj(ci1 , . . . , cin)
))
.
Since W ∩ModS∪C(T ) is nonempty and has the λ-Baire Property, there is
(M,~a) ∈W ∩ModS∪C(T ) \
⋃
i
CT,i.
Thus, for any j < λ, no subset of ~a realizes Σj(x¯) in M . Furthermore, by our
assumption (∗) above, no subset of 〈~a〉 realizes Σj(x¯) inM . This means thatM ↾ 〈~a〉
omits each Σj(x¯). The structure M ↾ 〈~a〉 is a model of T because M ↾ 〈~a〉 ≺CL M ,
since M ∈W. 
3.5. Omitting types in complete structures. Here, the background logic is
basic continuous logic, and S denotes a fixed signature with vocabulary S.
If Σ(x1, . . . , xn) is a type and δ ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1], we denote by Σδ(x1, . . . , xn) the
type consisting of all the formulas of the form
∃y1 . . . ∃yn
( ∧
k≤n
d(xk, yk) ≤ δ ∧ σ(y1, . . . , yn)
)
,
where σ ranges over all finite conjunctions of formulas in Σ.
Note that if a¯ = a1, . . . , an realizes Σ in a structure M , then every point in
the closed δ-ball of a¯ realizes Σδ, that is, if b¯ = b1 . . . , bn ∈ M is such that
maxk≤n d(ak, bk) ≤ δ, then b¯ realizes Σδ.
Definition 3.14. Let T be a consistent S-theory and let Σ(x¯) be an S-type of T .
(1) If λ is an uncountable cardinal, we will say that Σ(x¯) is metrically λ-
principal over T if Σδ is λ-principal over T for every δ > 0.
(2) We will say that a Σ is metrically ω-principal over T if for every δ > 0
there is a formula ϕ(x¯) such that
(a) ϕ(x¯) generates Σδ(x¯) over T , and
(b) T ∪ {ϕ(y¯) ≥ r} |=L,S Σδ(x¯), for some r ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1).
Proposition 3.15. Let T be a consistent S-theory and let Σ(x¯) be an S-type of T .
Then, for every infinite cardinal λ, the type Σ is metrically λ-principal over T if
and only if Σδ is λ-principal over T for every δ > 0.
Proof. For uncountable λ the proposition is true by definition. For λ = ω, we only
need to prove that if Σ(x1, . . . , xn) is an S-type of T such that Σ(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯)) is
metrically ω-principal over T , where t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯) are S-terms, then Σ(x1, . . . , xn)
is metrically ω-principal over T . Using the uniform continuity moduli of S as in
the proof of Lemma 3.11 one can see that for every ǫ ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1) there exist
δ, ρ ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1) such that if ϕ(x¯) generates Σδ(x¯) over T , and
T ∪ {ϕ(y¯) ≥ r} |=L,S Σ
δ(t1(y¯), . . . , tn(y¯)),
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then
∃u¯
( ∧
k≤n
d(xk, tk(u¯)) ≤ 0 ∧ ϕ(u¯)
)
≥ ρ |=L,S Σ
ǫ(x, . . . , x).

Proposition 3.16 (λ-Omitting Types Property for Complete Structures). Let λ
be any infinite cardinal. If T is an S-theory of cardinality ≤ λ that is satisfied by an
S-structure and {Σj(x¯)}j<λ is a set of S-types that are not metrically λ-principal
over T there is a model of T of cardinality ≤ λ whose metric completion omits each
Σj(x¯).
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 3.15 an the λ-Omitting Types Property of L.

An S-theory T is complete if for every S-sentence ϕ and every r ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1),
either ϕ ≤ r or ϕ ≥ r is in T . Note that this yields a concept of complete type,
since, in our context, types are theories.
If T is a complete S-theory, we can define a topology on the set of all complete
S-types of T , as follows. If p(x¯), q(x¯) are such types, where x¯ = x1 . . . , xn, we define
d(p, q) as the infimum the set of real numbers r such that there exist a model M of
T and tuples a¯, b¯ ∈ M satisfying maxk≤n d(ak, bk) ≤ r. A compactness argument
shows that d is a metric. Note that d(p, q) ≤ δ if and only if pδ ⊆ q, where pδ
is defined as above. Hence, if p(x¯) is metrically principal, δ > 0, and M is an
S-structure such that M |=CL T , then there exists q(x¯) such that d(p, q) ≤ δ and q
is realized in M . We use this to prove the following observation, due Henson:
Proposition 3.17. If T is a complete S-theory and M is a complete S-structure
such that M |=CL T , then every complete S-type of T that is metrically principal is
realized in M .
Proof. Fix T andM as in the statement of the proposition, and let p be a complete
S-type of T that is metrically principal. Using compactness and the preceding
observations, we find, inductively, a sequence (qn)n<ω of complete S-types for T , a
chain M = M0 ≺CL M1 ≺CL M2 ≺CL . . . of models of T , and sequences (a¯n)n<ω,
(b¯n)n<ω such that for every n < ω,
(1) qn ⊇ p2
−n
(so d(p, qn) ≤ 2−n),
(2) a¯n realizes qn in M ,
(3) b¯n realizes p in Mn+1,
(4) d(an, bn) ≤ 2−n,
(5) d(an+1, bn) ≤ 2−(n+1).
By (4) and (5) the sequences (a¯n)n<ω and (b¯n)n<ω are Cauchy and asymptotically
equivalent (in
⋃
n<ωMn). Since M is complete, their unique limit is in M , by (2).
By (3), this limit realizes p. 
Remark 3.18. By Propositions 3.16 and 3.17, if T is a complete S-theory and p
is a complete S-type of T , then p is metrically principal if and only if p is realized
in every complete S-structure that is a model of T . Hence, the special case of
Proposition 3.16 when λ = ω is Henson’s omitting types theorem for complete
metric structures [BYBHU08, Section 12], [BYU07, Section 1].
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4. The Main Theorem
Let CL denote basic continuous logic. We have proved (Theorem 3.7) that CL
has the κ-Omitting Types Property for every infinite cardinal κ. It then follows
that continuous logic and  Lukasziewicz-Pavelka logic have this property as well.
In this section we show that the κ-Omitting Types Property characterizes CL.
Analogous characterizations for continuous logic and  Lukasziewicz-Pavelka logic
follow as corollaries.
We prove that any [0, 1]-valued logic L for continuous metric structures that
extends CL and has the κ-Omitting Types Property for some uncountable regular
cardinal κ is equivalent to CL, as long as only vocabularies of cardinality less than
κ are considered. We will make some natural assumptions about L, namely,
(1) Closure under the basic connectives, and under the existential quantifier
(Definition 1.19),
(2) The finite occurrence property (Definition 1.9),
(3) Relativization to definable families of predicates (Definition 1.27),
(4) Every structure is equivalent in L to its metric completion (see Corol-
lary 1.23).
The following is the main result of the paper:
Theorem 4.1 (Main Theorem). Let L be a [0, 1]-valued logic that satisfies prop-
erties (1)–(5) above and has the κ-Omitting Types Property for some uncountable
regular cardinal κ. If L extends CL, then L is equivalent to CL for signatures of
cardinality less than κ.
Fix a cardinal κ as given by the statement of Theorem 4.1, let S be a signature of
cardinality less than κ, and let us view S-sentences a [0, 1]-valued functions on the
class of S-structures, by identifying an S-sentence ϕ with the function M 7→ ϕM .
The equivalence stated by Theorem 4.1 means that the logical topologies τL and
τCL on the class of S-structures coincide, so, for every S-sentence ϕ of L, the
class ModS(ϕ) is τCL-closed. This implies that every S-sentence L (viewed as
a [0, 1] valued function) is τCL-continuous, because if ϕ is such a sentence and
[r, s] is a subinterval of [0, 1] with rational endpoints, then ϕ−1[r, s] = ModS(ϕ ≥
r) ∩ModS(ϕ ≤ s). Since CL is compact, by the Stone-Weierstrass Theorem for
lattices, every sentence of L can be approximated, uniformly over the class of S-
structures, by sentences of CL.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of the Main Theorem. The
strategy of the proof is to show that if L extends CL strictly, then there exist
structures that are metrically isomorphic, but nonequivalent in L; this contradicts
the Isomorphism Property of L (see Definition 1.3).
The section is divided into two parts. In the first one we use the κ-Omitting
Types Property of the logic L to prove that L is λ-compact for every λ < κ
(Proposition 4.4), and the second part of the section is devoted to the proof of the
Main Theorem.
4.1. Obtaining compactness from the Omitting Types Property. Here, L
denotes a [0, 1]-valued logic that satisfies the hypotheses of the Main Theorem
(Theorem 4.1) and κ denotes an uncountable regular cardinal such that L has the
κ-Omitting Types Property.
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Recall that if M is an S-structure, an [0, 1]-valued predicate RM (x¯) is discrete
if RM only takes on values in {0, 1}. As we observed in Definition 1.26, if R is a
predicate in S, then the interpretation RM is discrete if and only if
M |=L ∀x¯ Discrete
(
R(x¯)
)
,
where Discrete
(
R(x¯)
)
is an abbreviation of the sentence R(x¯) ∨ ¬R(x¯).
Definition 4.2. Let M be a structure, P a new monadic predicate symbol, and
⊳ a new binary predicate symbol. We will say that (PM , ⊳M ) is a discrete linear
ordering if M |=L θ, where θ is the conjunction of the following sentences:
· ∀x Discrete
(
P (x)
)
· ∀x, y
(
¬P (x) ∨ ¬P (y) ∨Discrete(x ⊳ y)
)
· ∀x, y
(
¬P (x) ∨ ¬P (y) ∨Discrete(d(x, y)
)
· ∀x
[
¬P (x) ∨ ¬(x ⊳ x)
]
· ∀x, y
[
¬
(
P (x) ∧ P (y) ∧ (x ⊳ y)
)
∨ ¬(y ⊳ x)
]
· ∀x, y, z
[
¬
(
P (x) ∧ P (y) ∧ (x ⊳ y) ∧ (y ⊳ z)
)
∨ (x ⊳ z)
]
· ∀x, y
[
¬
(
P (x) ∧ P (y)
)
∨
(
(x ⊳ y) ∨ (y ⊳ x) ∨ ¬d(x, y)
]
.
Notice that if M be a structure, P is monadic predicate symbol, and (PM , ⊳M )
is a discrete linear ordering, then (PM , ⊳M ) is a linear ordering in the usual sense.
Lemma 4.3. Let T be a consistent L-theory of cardinality ≤ κ. If T has a model
M such that (PM , ⊳M ) is a discrete linear ordering with no right endpoint, then T
has a model N such that (PN , ⊳N) is a discrete linear ordering of cofinality κ.
Proof. Let (ci)i<κ be a family of new constants. Let θ be the sentence given in
Definition 4.2. Define
T ′ = T ∪ {θ} ∪ { ∀x (¬P (x) ∨ ∃y (P (y) ∧ (x ⊳ y) ) ) }
∪ {P (ci)}i<κ ∪ {(ci ⊳ cj) ∨ ¬d(ci, cj)}i<j<κ.
We first claim that T ′ is satisfiable. To see this, notice that if M is a model of T
such that (PM , ⊳M ) is a discrete linear ordering with no right endpoint, a ∈ PM ,
and cMi = a for all i < κ, then (M, c
M
i )i<κ |=L T
′.
Next, we claim that the type
Σ(x) = {P (x)} ∪ { ci ⊳ x ∨ ¬d(ci, x) }i<κ
is not κ-principal over T ′. Suppose the contrary, and assume that Φ(x) generates of
Σ(x) over T . Take a structureM and an element a ofM such thatM |=L T ′∪Φ[a].
IfM |=L ¬P [a], thenM 6|=L Σ[a], so Φ(x) cannot generate Σ(x) over T . Otherwise,
since |Φ(x)| < κ and L has the finite occurrence property, there is j < κ such that
cj does not occur in Φ(x). Since M |=L θ′ ∧P [a], we can find an interpretation cMj
of cj in M such that a ⊳ c
M
j . But then M 6|=L Σ[a], so Φ(x) cannot generate Σ(x)
over T .
Thus Σ(x) is not κ-principal over T ′. Since L has the κ-Omitting Types Property,
there is a model N of T ′ that omits Σ(x). This means that no element of PN is
an upper bound of {cNi }i<κ, i.e., the sequence (c
N
i )i<κ is cofinal in P
N . The result
then follows since κ is regular. 
Proposition 4.4. The logic L is λ-compact for every λ < κ.
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Proof. We prove the proposition by induction on all λ < κ. Fix λ < κ and suppose
L is µ-compact for every µ < λ. Let S = (S,U) be a signature, and let T = {ϕi}i<λ
be an L-theory such that every finite subset of T is satisfied by an S-structure. We
wish to show that T is satisfied by an S-structure.
Let S0 be the signature (S0,U0), where S0 is the subvocabulary of S formed
by the symbols of S that occur in T and U0 is the restriction of U to S0. By
the Reduct Property of logics (Definition 1.3), it suffices to show that T is satisfied
by an S0-structure. By the assumption that L has the finite occurrence property,
we have |S0| ≤ λ, so without loss of generality we can assume that the uniform
continuity moduli specified by U0 are made explicit by sentences in T , and hence
every S0-structure that satisfies T is bound to be S0-structure.
Let S+ be a vocabulary that results from adding to S a unary predicate symbol
P , two new binary predicate symbols, R and ⊳, and a family (ci)i<λ of new constant
symbols.
At this point we invoke the assumption (given on page 23) that the logic L
permits relativization to definable families of predicates: for each S-sentence ϕ
and each i < λ, let ϕ
{y|R(x,y)}
i (x) be a relativization of ϕi to {y | R(x, y)} (see
Definition 1.27). Define an S+-theory T+ by letting
T+ = {θ} ∪ {P (ci)}i<λ
∪
{
∀x
(
∀y (R(x, y) ∨ ¬R(x, y)) ∧ (¬(ci ⊳ x) ∨ ϕ
{y|R(x,y)}
i (x))
) }
i<λ
,
where θ is as in Definition 4.2. We first claim that T+ has a model M such that
(PM , ⊳M ) is a discrete linear ordering with no right endpoint. By the induction
hypothesis, for each j < λ, the theory {ϕi}i<j has a model Mj . Let M be the
S+-structure defined as follows:
· We have cMi 6= c
M
j if i < j < λ, and the universe of M is the disjoint union
of
⊔
i<λMi and {c
M
i }i<λ.
· The distance between pairs of elements of M in the same Mi is as given by
the metric of Mi, and between pairs of elements of M not in the same Mi
it is 1.
· If Q is a n-ary predicate symbol of S, the interpretation QM is
⊔
i<λ T
Mi
in
⊔
i<λM
n
i and 0 in M
n \
⊔
i<λM
n
i .
· If f is a n-ary operation symbol of S, and a¯ ∈ Mn, then fM (a¯) is fMi(a¯)
if a ∈Mni and c0 if a¯ ∈M
n \
⊔
i<λM
n
i .
· PM is the characteristic function of {cMi }i<λ.
· ⊳M is characteristic function of { (cMi , c
M
j ) | i < j }.
· RM is the characteristic function of
⋃
i<λ{ci} ×Mi.
By the renaming property of L (see Definition 1.3), M is a model of T+. Note
that (PM , ⊳M ) is a discrete linear ordering with no right endpoint. Thus, by
Lemma 4.3, there is a model N of T+ such that (PN , ⊳N ) is a discrete linear
ordering of cofinality κ. Since λ < κ, there is a ∈ N such that cNi E a
N for every
i < λ. Thus, N ↾ { b | N |=L R[a, b] } is a model of T . 
4.2. Proof of the Main Theorem. Recall that L denotes a [0, 1]-valued logic
that satisfies the hypotheses of the Main Theorem (Theorem 4.1) and κ denotes an
uncountable regular cardinal such that L has the κ-Omitting Types Property.
Since, by Proposition 4.4, L is λ-compact for every λ < κ, Proposition 2.5
provides the following result:
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Proposition 4.5. Let S be a signature with |S| < κ. If ≡CL ⇒ ≡L for S-structures,
then L is equivalent to CL for S-structures. 
Thus, all that remains in order to prove the Main Theorem is to show that
≡CL ⇒ ≡L for signatures of cardinality less than κ.
If S is a vocabulary andM0,M1 are S-structures, we form the combined structure
[M0,M1] in the following way. For each n-ary predicate symbol R of S let R
0, R1
be two distinct n-ary predicate symbols and for each n-ary operation symbol f of
S let f0, f1 be two distinct n-ary operation symbols. Let P0, P1 be new monadic
predicates. For k = 0, 1 let
Sk = {Rk | R in S } ∪ { fk | f in S } ∪ {Pk}.
Then [M0,M1] is the ({S0}∪{S1})-structure whose universe is the disjoint union of
the universes M0 and M1 (with the distance between elements of M0 and elements
of M1 being 1) and such that
· PMk is the characteristic function of Mk for k = 0, 1.
· For every n-ary predicate symbol R of S and every a¯ ∈Mn,
(Rk)[M0,M1](a¯) =
{
RMk(a¯), if a¯ ∈Mnk
0, otherwise.
· For every n-ary operation symbol f of S and every a¯ ∈Mn,
(f i)[M0,M1](a¯) =
{
fMk(a¯), if a¯ ∈Mnk
a, otherwise,
where a is a fixed element of M .
Now, the assumption that the logic L permits relativization to discrete predicates
(see page 23) allows us to fix for every S-sentence ϕ an Sk-sentence ϕk such that
[M0,M1] |=L ϕ
k if and only if Mk |=L ϕ.
Proof of the Main Theorem. As observed above, we only have to show ≡CL ⇒ ≡L
for signatures of cardinality less than κ. Suppose that this is not the case, and
fix a signature S of cardinality less than κ, and S-structures M0,M1 such that
M0≡CLM1 and
(†) M0 |=L γ but M1 |=L γ ≤ r
for some L-sentence γ and some r ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1). Our goal is to show that these
structures can be taken to be metrically isomorphic; by (†), this would contradict
property (3) of Definition 1.10.
Since L has the finite occurrence property, we may assume that the vocabulary
S is finite. Let {ci}i<κ be a set of new constants and for i = i1, . . . , in ∈ κ, denote
ci1 , . . . , cin by ci. For each X ⊆ κ, let SX = S
0 ∪ S1 ∪ {c0i , c
1
i }i∈X . Define an
Sκ-theory T as follows:
T = {γ0} ∪ {γ1 ≤ r} ∪ {P0(c
0
i )}i<κ ∪ {P1(c
1
i )}i<κ∪{
ψ0(c0i )→L(ψ
1(c1i ) ≥ s)
∣∣ ψ(x¯) an S-formula of CL,
i in κ with ℓ(i) = ℓ(x¯), s ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1)
}
.
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Our initial goal is to show that T is consistent. In order to do so, it is sufficient to
show that the S1-theory
T1 = {γ
0} ∪ {γ1 ≤ r} ∪ {P0(c
0
0)} ∪ {P1(c
1
0)}∪{
ψ0(c00)→L(ψ
1(c10) ≥ s)
∣∣ ψ(x) an S-formula of CL, s ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1)}.
is consistent, since any model N of T1 can be expanded to a model of T by defining
(c0i )
N = (c00)
N and (c1i )
N = (c10)
N for i < κ.
Now, T1 is countable since S is finite, so by the ω-compactness of L, we need
only show that every finite subset of T1 has a model.
Claim. Let {ψk(x)}k≤m be a finite set of S-formulas of CL and let s ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1)
be given. Then for every a ∈M0 there is b ∈M1 such that
[M0,M1] |=L P0[a] ∧ P1[b] ∧
∧
k≤m
(ψ0k[a]→L(ψ
1
k[b] ≥ s)).
Proof of the claim. Fix a ∈ M0 and s ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1). For each k ≤ m choose
rk, tk ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1) such that
(ψk[a])
M0 − (1− s) ≤ rk < tk ≤ (ψk[a])
M0
and set ǫ = mink≤m tk − rk. Since M0 |=L ∃x(
∧
k≤m(ψk(x) ≥ tk)), the same
sentence holds inM1, thus there is b inM1 such that (
∧
k≤m(ψk[b] ≥ tk))
M1 ≥ 1−ǫ.
For each k,
(ψk[b] ≥ tk)
M1 ≥ 1− ǫ ≥ 1− (tk − rk).
Hence, by Proposition 1.16,
(ψk[b])
M1 ≥ tk + 1− (tk − rk)− 1 = rk ≥ (ψk[a])
M0 − (1 − s) = s+ (ψk[a])
M0 − 1,
which by the same proposition yields (ψk[b] ≥ s)M1 ≥ (ψk[a])M0 . Thus,
[M0,M1] |=L
∧
k≤m
(ψ0k[a]→L (ψk[b] ≥ s)).
By the claim, every finite subset of T1 is satisfied by an expansion by constants
of [M0,M1]; hence, by the ω-compactness of L, the theory T1 has a model. As
observed above, every such model yields a model of T .
Our next (and final) goal is to show that T has a model [Mˆ0, Mˆ1] such that the
set
{
(c0i )
Mˆ0
}
i<κ
is dense in Mˆ0, and the set
{
(c1i )
Mˆ1
}
i<κ
is dense in Mˆ1. Once this
is accomplished, the definition of T ensures that the map
(c0i )
Mˆ0 7→ (c1i )
Mˆ1
is a metric isomorphism between a dense subset of Mˆ0 and a dense subset of Mˆ1.
Since all the predicates in S are uniformly continuous with respect to the distin-
guished metric, our isomorphism can be uniquely extended to a metric isomorphism
between the completion of Mˆ0 and the completion of Mˆ1. But since, by assumption,
every structure is equivalent in L to its completion, the completion of Mˆ0 satisfies
γ, whereas the completion of Mˆ1 satisfies γ ≤ r, which contradicts the isomorphism
property of L (see Definition 1.3).
By the preceding remark, all that remains to show is that there is a model of T
that omits all the types
Σǫ(x) =
{
(P0(x) ∧ d(x, c
0
i ) ≥ ǫ) ∨ (P1(x) ∧ d(x, c
1
j ) ≥ ǫ)
}
i,j<κ
(ǫ ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1)).
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Since L has the κ-Omitting Types Property, it suffices to show that Σǫ(x) is not
κ-principal over T , for each ǫ ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1). Suppose that Σǫ(x) is κ-principal for
some ǫ, and let Φ(x) generate Σǫ(x) over T .
Fix δ ∈ Q ∩ (0, ǫ). For X ⊆ κ let us denote T ↾ SX as TX , and let
X0 = {0} ∪
{
j | c0j or c
1
j occurs in Φ(x)
}
.
Since |Φ(x)| < κ and L has the finite occurrence property, there is j1 ∈ κ \X0. Let
X1 = X0 ∪ {j1}. We now use the |Φ|-compactness of L to show that the set
(‡) TX1 ∪ Φ(x) ∪ {¬P0(x) ∨ d(x, c
0
j1
) ≤ δ}
is satisfiable. Since Φ(x) generates Σǫ(x), there is an Sκ-structure [M
′
0,M
′
1] and
a ∈ M ′0 such that [M
′
0,M
′
1] |=L T ∪ Φ[a]. If a ∈ M
′
1, the satisfiablity of (‡) is
immediate (since ¬P
[M ′
0
,M ′
1
]
0 (a) = 1), so suppose a ∈ M
′
0. Since M0≡CLM1, the
argument used to prove our claim shows that
(⋄)
for every finite set {ψk(x¯, y)}k≤m of S-formulas of CL and every
s ∈ Q∩ (0, 1) there is b in M ′1 such that whenever ℓ(i) = ℓ(x¯), the
structure [M ′0,M
′
1] satisfies∧
k≤m
(ψ0k(c
0
i , y)[a]→L(ψ
1
k(c
1
i , y)[b] ≥ s)).
Let Γ(c0
i
, c1
i
, c0j1 , c
1
j1
) be a finite subset of TX1 , where i ∈ X0 and all the new
constants are being displayed, and let S(Γ) denote the finite part of SX0 that
occurs in Γ. Notice that the reduct [M ′0,M
′
1] ↾ S(Γ) satisfies Γ ↾ SX0 . Let
ψ0(x¯, y), . . . , ψm(x¯, y)
be a list of all the S-formulas such that the implications
ψ00(c
0
i , c
0
j1
)→L(ψ
1
0(c
1
i , c
1
j1
) ≥ s0), . . . , ψ
0
m(c
0
i , c
0
j1
)→L(ψ
1
m(c
1
i , c
1
j1
) ≥ sm)
occur in Γ, let s = mink≤m sk, and fix b ∈M ′1 corresponding to {ψk(x¯, y)}k≤m and
s as given by (⋄). Now let
([M ′0,M
′
1] ↾ S(Γ), a, b)
denote the expansion of [M ′0,M
′
1] ↾ S(Γ) to SX1 where a is the interpretation of c
0
j1
and b is interpretation of c1j1 . Then, by (⋄), we have(
[M ′0,M
′
1] ↾ S(Γ), a, b
)
|=L Γ(c
0
i , c
1
i , c
0
j1
, c1j1).
By the choice of a, [M ′0,M
′
1] |=L T ∪Φ[a], and trivially, we also have
([M ′0,M
′
1] ↾ S(Γ), a, b) |=L d(x, c
0
j1
)[a] ≤ δ.
Therefore a realizes
Γ(c0
i
, c1
i
, c0j1 , c
1
j1
) ∪ Φ[a] ∪ {¬P0(x) ∨ d(x, c
0
j1
) ≤ δ}
in the structure ([M ′0,M
′
1] ↾ S(Γ), a, b
)
. Since L is |Φ|-compact and Γ is an arbitrary
finite subset of TX1 , this shows that (‡) is satisfiable.
Fix now j2 ∈ κ \X1, and let X2 = X1 ∪ {j2}. An argument symmetric to that
which produced a model of (‡) shows that the theory
TX2 ∪ Φ(x) ∪ { (¬P0(x) ∨ d(x, c
0
j1
) ≤ δ) ∧ (¬P1(x) ∨ d(x, c
1
j1
) ≤ δ) }
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is satisfied by an SX2 -structure. To conclude the proof, we only need to expand
this model to an Sκ-structure, i.e., we need to find interpretations for the constants
c0i , c
1
i with i ∈ κ \X2 in such a way that
T ∪ Φ(x) ∪ { (¬P0(x) ∨ d(x, c
0
j1
) ≤ δ) ∧ (¬P1(x) ∨ d(x, c
1
j1
) ≤ δ) }
is still satisfied; but this can be done by simply giving c0i , c
1
i , for i ∈ κ \ X2, the
same interpretation as c00, c
1
0. Since δ < ǫ,
T ∪Φ(x) 6|=L Σǫ(x),
so Φ(x) does not generate Σǫ(x), as presumed. This concludes the proof that Σǫ(x)
is not κ-principal over T , and thus the proof of the Main Theorem. 
The preceding proof is a refinement of the proof of the main theorem in [Lin78].
Remark 4.6. The κ-Omitting Types Property for a theory T states that for every
set of at most κ types that are not κ-principal over T there is a model of T that
omits all the types in the set. In the proof of Theorem 4.1, we needed only a weak
version of this property, namely, we need the existence of a model of T that omits
countable sets of types that are not κ-principal. Thus, in basic continuous logic,
the κ-Omitting Types Property is equivalent to this apparently weaker version of
it.
Corollary 4.7. Let L be a [0, 1]-valued logic.
(1) If L satisfies properties (1)–(5) of page 23, L extends  Lukasziewicz-Pavelka
logic, and there exists an uncountable regular cardinal κ such that L satis-
fies the κ-Omitting Types Property, then L is equivalent to  Lukasziewicz-
Pavelka logic for signatures of cardinality less than κ.
(2) If L satisfies properties (1)–(4) of page 23, L extends continuous logic, and
there exists an uncountable regular cardinal κ such that L satisfies the κ-
Omitting Types Property for complete structures, then L is equivalent to
continuous logic for signatures of cardinality less than κ.
Proof. We note first that the methods used in the proof of Theorem 4.1 to produce
new structures from old ones (i.e., the construction ofM from {Mj}j<λ in the proof
of Proposition 4.4 and the construction of [M0,M1] from M0 and M1 on page 26)
yield complete structures from complete structures and 1-Lipschitz structures from
1-Lipschitz structures. Hence, (1) and (2) above follow by assuming throughout the
proof of Theorem 4.1 that all the structures involved are complete, or 1-Lipschitz,
accordingly. 
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